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THE THREE JUDGE RULE
The maintenance of balance between the state and federal
power is one of the continuing problems created by our dual
system of government. The Constitution of the United States
provides that the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance
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thereof shall be the supreme law of the land. Congress has pro-
vided procedural methods by which this supremacy shall be
maintained. Section 2371 of the federal Judicial Code provides
for review by federal authorities of state judicial action, and
under Section 24 2 federal courts have jurisdiction to restrain
state encroachment on private federal rights. Prior to 1910,
single judges in a federal district or circuit court, on ex parte
hearings and affidavits, had held the enormous power of holding
void acts of state legislatures and commissions, often for consid-
erable periods, on the ground that they were unconstitutional.
This situation was made less objectionable by the Act of June 18,
1910,3 which required the concurrence of at least two of three
judges who must be called in to sit in a suit for an interlocutory
injunction to restrain the action of any officer of a state under
a statute alleged to be unconstitutional. , A temporary restrain-
ing order could be issued by a single judge, but was to remain in
force only until the hearing and determination of the applica-
tion for an interlocutory injunction. A direct appeal to the
Supreme Court from an order granting or denying the interlocu-
tory injunction was provided for. These provisions were incor-
porated into the Judicial Code as Section 266 in 1911.4
In 1913 5 the jurisdiction of the "three judge court" was ex-
tended to include the orders of state boards or commissions.
The Supreme Court construed this to include attacks on such
orders although the constitutionality of the statute under which
the commission acted was not attacked; But the jurisdiction of
the federal court was limited by the provision that, if the alleged
unconstitutional action of the state officers or board were stayed
in a suit brought in a state court before the application in the
federal court had been finally heard, the proceedings in the latter
should be stayed until final determination of the suit in the state
court. But the action in the state court, it was said, must be
such that the same issues can be framed and the same ques-
tions considered as are raised in the federal court and the stay
secured must protect the particular plaintiff seeking the aid of
128 U. S. C. § 344 (1926).
228 U. S. C. § 41 (1926).
3 The Mann-Elkins Act, Act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, § 17, 36 STAT. 539,
557 (1910). "This was a compromise between the wish on the part of the
House to deprive the federal courts entirely of this jurisdiction, and the
insistence of the Senate to the contrary." Pogue, State Dete'rmination of
State Law and the Judicial Code (1928) 41 HAIV. L. R.V. 623.
4 Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 STAT- 1162 (1911).
5 Act of March 4, 1913, c. 160, 37 STAT. 1013 (1913).
6 Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290, 43 Sup. Ct. 353 (1923);
Southern Ry. v. Query, 21 F. (2d). 333 (E. D. S. C. 1927); Louisville &
N. R. R. v. Railroad Commission, 208 Fed. 35 (M. D. Ala. 1913). Contra:
Michigan State Telephone Co. v. Odell, 283 Fed. 139 (E. D. Mich. 1922).
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the federal court.7  And if a temporary restraining order had
already been issued by the federal court when the stay in the
state court was secured, the federal court retained its jurisdic-
tion.8 The stay might be vacated if the suit was not being prose-
cuted with "diligence and good faith." 0
In 1925 the section was again amended to extend the require-
ment of three judges to the final hearing, from which also a di-
rect appeal to the Supreme Court is allowed.O But this has
been narrowly restricted to cases where a hearing for a prelim-
inary injunction has also been had.1" Thus the plaintiff is given
an election, depending on whether he chooses to press for a pre-
liminary injunction, of getting a three judge court and a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court, or a single judge and an appeal to
the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Section 266 does not purport to define exclusively the elements
7 Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 255 U. S. 288, 41 Sup. Ct. 272
(1921) ; Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Hilton, 274 Fed. 334 (D.
Mdinn. 1921).
sUnion Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, 17 F. (2d)
143 (E. D. Ky. 1926).
9 Judicial Code § 266, 28 U. S. C. § 380 (1926).
1o See Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Act of
Febryanj 13, 1925 (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 1, 10.
Prior to this act, the final hearing in the suit was had before a single
judge. From his decree a direct appeal to the Supreme Court could be
founded only upon the provisions of Section 238 [28 U. S. C. § 345 (1926)]
as originally enacted. This permitted a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court as the only method of review if the jurisdiction of the district court
rested solely upon an attack upon a state statute because of its alleged
violation of the Federal Constitution. But where the jurisdiction of the
district court was invoked upon other federal grounds as well as the one
attacking the constitutionality of the state statute, an appeal might be
taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals, with ultimate review in the Supreme
Court if the case was of the class within its jurisdiction. See Crescent
Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 242 Fed. 462, 464 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917). But Section
238 was so far changed by the Act of 1925 that now there is no right
of direct appeal on constitutional grounds unless the case arises under
Section 266. Direct appeals are therefore now allowed from final decrees
only where the hearing for an interlocutory injunction is required to be
before three judges, where such hearing has been had, and a final decree
by three judges issued.
"I Smith v. Wilson, 273 U. S. 388, 47 Sup. Ct. 385 (1927). The Court
here refused to decide whether it would be error if three judges had sat.
But in Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. v. United States, 6 F. (2d) 888 (N. D.
Tex. 1925), af'd, 274 U. S. 29, 47 Sup. Ct. 486 (1927), it was held proper
for three judges to sit on final hearing where they were called in to listen
to a bill for a restraining order, and then the parties agreed that the
hearing should be considered as a hearing on the merits.
See Frankfurter and Landis, The Supernzc Court under the Judiciary Act
of 1925 (1928) 42 HARv. L. REv. 1, 24; see also Film Transport Co, v.
Michigan P. U. Commission, 17 F. (2d) 857 (E. D. Mich. 1927); Hi-Ball
Transit Co. v. Railroad Commission, 27 F. (2d) 425 (N. D. Tex. 1928).
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necessary for relief thereunder. In general, three requisites
must be present. 2
First, there must be a case cognizable in a federal court o±
equity. The unconstitutionality of a state law is not of itself
ground for relief in the federal courts. There must be a threat
of "irreparable injury" or the absence of an "adequate remedy
at law," which, however, the courts have experienced little diffi-
culty in "finding." 13 The existence of a legal remedy in a state
court does not preclude federal equity jurisdiction.14  And the
federal courts have been reluctant to hold that a legal remedy
available in a state court can be enforced in a federal court so
as to preclude federal equitable jurisdiction.6 The requirement
that state administrative remedies be exhausted as a prerequis-
ite to federal equitable aid 1 seems to have been relaxed.", And
the pendency of an appeal in the state court from the commis-
12 The original jurisdiction of the district courts is now defined by Section
24 of the Judicial Code.
An interesting analogy to the "three judge court" grew out of the Com-
merce Court which was originally vested with jurisdiction to pass upon
judgments of the Interstate Commerce Commission. This court was short
lived and was abolished by the Act of October 22, 1913, 38 STAT. 208, 219
(1913). This act vested jurisdiction in the district court, and provided:
"No interlocutory injunction suspending or restraining the enforcement,
operation, or execution of, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any order
made or entered into by the Interstate Commerce Commission shall bo
issued or granted by any District Court of the United States, or by anyjudge thereof, or by any circuit judge acting as District Judge, unless the
application for the same shall be presented to a Circuit or District Judge,
and shall be heard and determined by three judges . .. unless a majority
of said three judges shall concur in granting such application. When such
application as aforesaid is presented to a judge, he shall immediately call
to his assistance to hear and determine the application two other judges."
38 STAT. 220 (1913). Cf. Home Furniture Co. v. United States, 2 F. (2d)
765 (W. D. Tex. 1924). Thus it seems that whether relief be sought under
a state rate which conflicts with an. order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission or whether an order of the commission itself is questioned,
an interlocutory injunction in the federal courts may be issued only by a
specially constituted district court of three judges.
13 See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 214, 44 Sup. Ct. 15, 17
(1923); Herkness v. Irion, 11 F. (2d) 386 (E. D. La. 1926); see Com-
ment (1927) 36 YA.LE L. J. 845, 850.
14 Bacon v. Rutland R. R., 232 U. S. 134, 34 Sup. Ct. 283 (1914) ; Chicago,
B. & 0. Ry. v. Osborne, 265 U. S. 14, 44 Sup. Ct. 431 (1924); Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cushman, 292 Fed. 930 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923), cert. denied,
263 U. S. 729, 44 Sup. Ct. 181 (1924); Van Wertb Gaslight Co. v. P. U.
Commission, 299 Fed. 670 (S. D. Ohio, 1924).
15 Southern Ry. v. Query, supra note 6; (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 378; Risty
v. Chicago Ry., 270 U. S. 378, 46 Sup. Ct. 236 (1926); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Tax Commission, 21 F. (2d) 355 (S. D. Ohio, 1927).
16 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210, 29 Sup. Ct. 67 (1908);
Trenton & Mercer County Traction Corp. v. Trenton, 227 Fed. 502 (D. X.
J. 1915), aff'd, 229 Fed. 140 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916).
"7 Banton v. Belt Line Ry., 268 U. S. 413, 45 Sup. Ct. 534 (1925) ; Smith
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sion's order will not debar federal aid.' But after a state court
has adjudged the matter on appeal, the federal courts will not
take original jurisdiction of the issue.1 A suit brought before
the effective date of the statute has been held not premature, on
the ground that the injury might become irreparable if no relief
is possible before the effective date.20 In fact, the writ of injunc-
tion has been stretched far beyond its original scope in, order
that the constitutional questions might be presented for deter-
mination by way of what in effect is a declaratory judgment:'
Second, the matter in controversy must exceed, "exclusive ot
interests and costs, the sum or value of $3,000." 22 This amount
does not depend solely upon initial cost, but may include future
maintenance. If the capitalization necessary to meet the main-
tenance exceeds the required amount, this element is satisfied.
It is sufficient if the bill discloses that the enforcement of the
statute or order sought to be enjoined will have the effect of
materially increasing the plaintiff's expenditures, as well as
causing him injury in other respects:-3 But the existence of the
jurisdictional amount is generally assumed without discussion
in cases under Section 266. This is true although the amount of
damages that is threatened is entirely speculative.
Third, the constitutionality of some state statute or order of a
state administrative commission must be called into question.
The word "statute," as used in this section, has been strictly con-
strued to mean a statute or law directly passed by the legislature
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U. S. 587, 46 Sup. Ct. 408 (1926); cf. Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Tax Commission, supra note 15.
The fact that orders of the state commission merely prescribed temporary
rates to be effective until final determination does not prevent equitable
relief where such orders are final while in effect. Prendergast v. Tel. Co.,
262 U. S. 43, 43 Sup. Ct. 466 (1923).
Is Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Russell, supra note 6.
19fDetroit & Mackinac Ry. v. Michigan Railroad Commission, 2]5 U. S.
402, 35 Sup. Ct. 126 (1914). Otherwise if the state appellate court has
legislative powers. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, szpra note 16.
2o Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571 (1923);
cf. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1926).
21 See Comment (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 845, 850.
The existence of a constitutional question does not permit a stockholder
to maintain a bill under Section 266 without complying with Equity Rule
27, where the right of action to restrain the enforcement of the statute
as an unconstitutional deprivation of the liberty and property of the
corporation by the state statute was a right existing in the corporation
itself. The stockholder must show that he has exhausted the means within
his reach to obtain action by the corporation in conformity with his
wishes. Wathen v. Jackson Oil Co., 235 U. S. 635, 35 Sup. Ct. 225 (1915).
22Section 24 of the Judicial Code, par. 1, 28 U. S. C. § 41 (1) (1926).
23 Western & A. R. R. v. Railroad Commission, 261 U. S. 264, 43 Sup.
Ct. 252 (1923). (initial expense of spur track only $1260); Packard v.
Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257 (1924).
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of the state, and hence does not apply to municipal ordinances.2
It is the threatened action of some "state" official or board that
is involved, and hence municipal boards, 25 county commission-
ers, 26 and local district commissioners 27 are not included, though
they may act pursuant to a state statute. But if the commission,
though incorporated, has authority to act for the state and
throughout it, its members have been held "state officers" within
this section.2 8  The making of assessments 29 or publication of
rates o are not "orders" whose operation may be restrained
under Section 266. This section also does not apply where
officers of a state pretend to act under a statute which is alleged
to have gone out of forcen or where the acts of the officials
are alleged to be outside of and beyond the powers conferred on
them by a statute the constitutionality of which is not attacked.82
The term "unconstitutionality" refers only to the federal Con-
stitution.33 But once the jurisdiction of the federal court is
24Ex parte Collins, 277 U. S. 565, 48 Sup. Ct. 585 (1928); Cumberland
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Memphis, 198 Fed. 955 (W. D. Tenn. 1912);
Sperry & Hutchinson v. City of Tacoma, 190 Fed. 682 (C. C. Wash. 1911);
Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. City of Birmingham, 211 Fed. 497 (N. D.
Ala. 1913), aff'd, 213 Fed. 450 (C. C. A. 5th, 1914); Land Development Co.
v. City of New Orleans, 13 F. (2d) 898 (1926), rev'd on other grounds, 17
F. (2d) 1016 (1927).
A city ordinance, however, has been held a statute within Section 237
(a). King Manufacturing Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U. S. 100,
48 Sup. Ct. 489 (1928); Comment (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 359.
25 Petition of Public Nat. Bank of N. Y., 49 Sup. Ct. 43 (U. S. 1928);
City of Dallas v. Dallas Tel. Co., 272 Fed. 410 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921).20 Connor v. Board of Com'rs of Logan County, 12 F. (2d), 789 (S. D.
Ohio, 1926); Henrietta Mills Co. v. Rutherford County, 26 F. (2d) 799
(W. D. N. C. 1928).
27 Rorick v. Board of Com'rs of Everglades Drainage Dist., 27 F. (2d)
377 (N. D. Fla. 1928),; of. Silvey v. Com'rs of Montgomery County, 273
Fed. 202 (S. D. Ohio, 1921).
2sSuncrest Lumber Co. v. N. C. Park Commission, decided November
27, 1928 by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
29 Ex parte Williams, 277 U. S. 267, 48 Sup. Ct. 523 (1928).
30 Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 280 Fed. 901
(E. D. S, C. 1922).
3' In re Buder, 271 U. S. 461, 46 Sup. Ct. 557 (1926).
32 Council of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 Fed. 390 (a.
C. A. 8th, 1920); see Grigsby v. Harris, 27 F. (2d) 945, 946 (S. D. Tox.
1928); Isseks, Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts to Enjoi Unau-
thorized Action of State Officials (1927) 40 HARv. L. Rv. 969.
33 Cook v. Burnquist, 242 Fed. 321 (D. Minn. 1917).
Almost invariably the constitutional issue is pleaded under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Other provisions of the Constitution are often included,
sometimes inappropriately. The great bulk of all decisions under Section
266 is devoted to dissertations of constitutional meaning after acceptance
of the issues. The issues seem to have included everything from vasectomy
[Berry v. Davis, 242 U. S. 468, 37 Sup. Ct. 208 (1917)] to prohibitions
on placing "shoddy in comfortables." A great majority of the cases have
arisen under rate and license statutes and orders of public service boards.
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invoked under Section 266, it may consider all questions in the
case, local as well as federal34
Where the orders of a commission carry with them a provision
for penalties for disobedience, federal jurisdiction is invoked
on the ground that under the Constitution penalties cannot be
collected if they operate to deter an interested party from testing
the validity of statutes or orders. Liability to a penalty before
the validity of such command has been determined, which would
put the party affected in a position where he himself must, at
his own risk, pass upon the question of uncertain legality, may
amount to a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 But if
the penalty provisions alone are relied on to invoke federal juris-
diction, a suit brought under Section 266 will be dismissed where
the statutory penalties are clearly separable from a reasonable
order of the commission.6 And where so separable, and no
attempt has been made to enforce the penalties, the federal
court will not pass upon their validity.37
As Section 266 provides only for injunctive relief, obviously
the suit must be commenced by a bill of complaint, properly
entitled, filed with a justice of the Supreme Court, or a circuit
or district judge. The jurisdictional elements must appear upon
the face of the bill.38 If they do, the single judge is bound to
call two other judges to hear the application. But five days'
notice must be given to the governor and the attorney general
of the state and the other defendants before the hearing. The
34 Louisville & N. R. R. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 34 Sup. Ct. 48 (1913) ;
Van Dyke v. Geary, 244 U. S. 39, 37 Sup. Ct. 483 (1917); Wofford Oil
Co. v. Smith, 263 Fed. 396 (M. D. Ala. 1920).
If the case can be disposed of without considering whether the acts
violated the federal Constitution, the court may do so. See Connecting
Gas Co. v. Imes, 11 F. (2d) 191 (S. D. Ohio, 1926). But the Supreme
Court has refused to decide the constitutionality of a statute under the
state constitution where the state court has had no opportunity to pass
upon the question, and the case could be disposed of on federal grounds.
Michigan Commission v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct. 191 (1925).
25 Kern Trading & Oil Co. v. Associated Pipe Line Co., 217 Fed. 273
(N. D. Cal. 1914). The power of the state to prescribe penalties heavy
enough to compel obedience to administrative orders is not questioned; its
exercise is not the basis of the federal court's jurisdiction. See Wadley
Southern Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 662, 35 Sup. Ct. 214, 218 (1915).
In many states interested parties may avoid acting at their peril by
bringing an action for a declaratory judgment. Erwin Billiard Parlor
Co. v. Buckner, 300 S. W. 565 (Tenn. 1927).
36 Phoenix Railway v. Geary, 239 U. S. 277, 306 Sup. Ct. 45 (1915);
Grand Trunk 1y. v. Michigan Railroad Commission, 193 Fed. 1009 (E. D.
Mich. 1912), aifd, 231 U. S. 457, 34 Sup. Ct. 152 (1923).
37 Phoenix Railway v. Geary, supra note 36.
38 If the bill fails to show the proper jurisdictional elements, the judge
need not call in two other judges. Chandler v. Neff, 298 Fed. 515 (W. D.
Tex. 1924); cf. Home Furniture Co. v. United States, 2 F. (2d) 765 (W.
D. Tex. 1924).
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section provides that the hearing upon the application shall be
given precedence and shall be in every way expedited and be
assigned for a hearing at the earliest practicable day. If the
judge refuses to call two others, no appeal therefrom can be
taken, but the Supreme Court will issue mandamus.31 It has no
discretion to grant or refuse the writ dependent upon its con-
ception as to whether the state statute is or is not constitu-
tional. 40 But if the three judge court takes jurisdiction and
issues a decree, the Supreme Court may review the entire case.41
Where, pending the appeal from the district court, the state
statute or order is modified, the Supreme Court is not deprived
of power to review the cause. However, it seems inclined to
give weight to the action and consider its operation in disposing
of the case.42  The death of the officer sought to be enjoined
does not abate the action, which may be continued against his
successor.
43
39 Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U. S. 539 (1911); Ex parto
Williams, supra note 29; Grigsby v. Harris, supra note 32.
40 Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., supra note 39. Where the three
judge court denies the application on the ground that it is without juris-
diction, the Supreme Court will remand the cause for consideration on Its
merits if it finds that the lower court did have jurisdiction. Oklahoma
Gas Co. v. Russell, supra note 6.
41 Louisville & N. R. R. v. Garrett; Van Dyke v. Geary, both sitpra note
34.
42 Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331, 40 Sup. Ct. 338
(1920) ; Texas Co. v. Brown, supra note 34. So where the objectionable
statute was repealed pending determination of the case, the Supreme Court
refused to pass upon the validity of the injunction granted by the three
judge court, as all possibility or threat of the operation had disappeared.
Berry v. Davis, supra note 33.
The Supreme Court is reluctant, on appeal, to reverse the decision of
the three judge court under Section 266 "upon what is solely a question
of fact and an exercise of sound judicial discretion as to the just balance
of convenience in granting or withholding a temporary suspension of the
operation of a state law. . . " Chicago G. W. Ry, v. Kendall, 266 U. S.
94, 45 Sup. Ct. 55 (1924). It will not consider rulings assailed and assigned
as error in the record, but not in the argument. Southeastern Express
Co. v. Robertson, 264 U. S. 541, 44 Sup. Ct. 424 (1924).
Where an appeal from an order refusing an interlocutory injunction is
followed by an appeal from a final decree dismissing the bill, on the same
ground, the first appeal is dismissed and relief granted under the second.
Pacific Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U. S. 196, 44 Sup. Ct. 553 (1924).
43 This is provided for in the Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 43 STAT. 941 (1925).
Prior to this the rule was long established in the federal courts that suits
of this nature were against the officer individually on his personal obliga-
tion and not against the office. Hence, upon the death of a defendant,
the action abated and might not be continued against the successor in
office. As to federal officers, the Act of Feb. 8, 1899, 30 STAT. 822, C. 121
(1899) provided that successors of officers of the United States might be
substituted for them in suits against the latter in their official capacity.
But the old rule applied to state officers. Pullman Co. v. Croom, 231 11.
S. 571, 34 Sup. Ct. 182 (1913). The only exception existed in cases of
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A single judge has no power to affect the operation of the
order of the court constituted by the three judges granting or
denying the interlocutory injunction applied for." He cannot
continue a temporary restraining order after the three judges
have refused an interlocutory injunction-O The three judge
court, however, may grant such continuance pendink appeal.,,
The Supreme Court also has this power, but it will generally
refer the matter to the three judges who passed upon the appli-
cation for a preliminary injunction.4 7
These, in general, are the results obtained under the operation
of the "three judge rule." The concurrence of at least two of
three judges in issuing an injunction was required for the pur-
pose of decreasing the ease with which state activity had for-
merly been restrained.48 The rule has probably served its
purpose in the sparsely settled districts where federal judges
are few and widely separated; but in the busy eastern centers,
where the meeting of three judges can be easily effected, there
seems to have been no increase in the difficulty of obtaining
injunctions. Federal interference has not been decreased by
the clause providing for a stay of proceedings in the federal
courts if the enforcement of a statute or commission order has
been stayed in an action in a state court. This is partly due to
the strict interpretation placed upon this section; 9 but more
boards of quasi-judicial character having a continued existence. Mlarshall
v. Dye, 231 U. S. 250, 34 Sup. Ct. 92 (1913).
44But the three judge court may delegate to the local judge the issue
of the injunction on performance of the conditions specified in its decree.
Mo iroe Gaslight & Fuel Co. v. Michigan P. U. Commission, 292 Fed. 19
(E. D. Mich. 1923); Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Railroad Commission, 1 F. (2d)
805 (E. D. Ky. 1923). And it may authorize him to issue a similar injunc-
tion to any other intervener or plaintiff whose case is not essentially
distinguishable from that of the plaintiff in the suit in which the injunction
has been granted, without a further hearing before the three judges. J. &
A. Freiberg Co. v. Dawson, 274 Fed. 420 (W. D. Ky. 1920), aff'd, 235 U. S.
288, 41 Sup. Ct. 272 (1921).
47 Equity Rule 74, which authorizes a justice or judge who tool: part
in a decision of an equity suit granting or dissolving an injunction to
make an order suspending, modifying, or restoring the injunction pend-
ing the appeal upon proper terms, does not apply to a single judge under
Section 266. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. La. P. S. Commission, 260
U. S. 212, 43 Sup. Ct. 75 (1922).4 6 Phoenix Ry. v. Geary, supra note 36; Virginia Ry. v. United States,
272 U. S. 658, 47 Sup. Ct. 222 (1926). The issue of the stay requires
the assent of the three judges given after the application is made, evi-
denced by their signatures or an announcement in open court with three
judges sitting, followed by a formal order tested as they direcL
47 Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. La. P. S. Commission, sMpra note 45.
48 See Chicago etc. Ry. v. Oglesby, 198 Fed. 153, 156 (W. D. Mlo. 1912).
The passage of Section 266 was probably influenced to a great extent by
the decision in Larabee v. Dolley, 175 Fed. 376 (D. Kan. 1909).
49 See notes 7 and 8 supra; Gen. Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Williams,
12 F. (2d) 773 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926).
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important is the lack of machinery by which the stays in state
actions could be secured before resort to the federal courts has
proved successful.50 Furthermore, one may avoid the provisions
of Section 266 entirely by failing to press for a preliminary
injunction and -requesting a hearing on the merits by one judge.51
This can be remedied by an amendment to the section extending
the requirement of three judges to hearings on the merits where
no interlocutory injunction has been requested, and providing
for direct obligatory appeal therefrom.
The preference which the federal courts have enjoyed with
respect to actions to restrain state activity is due largely to the
greater likelihood of getting injunctions in the federal courts.
The state courts have shovn a strong tendency to construe stat-
utes and orders of commissions in favor of their validity, and
injunctive relief has been seldom secured,2 In addition, the
50 Pogue, op. cit. supra note 3, suggests the passage of state statutes
to provide adequate machinery for securing stays in state courts. As-
suming that this legislation could be secured, the accomplishment oft its
purpose is doubtful, as the complainant might still secure a temporary
restraining order or an interlocutory injunction before the state courts
could issue a stay in an appropriate action.
51 The situation as it exists at present is peculiarly anomalous. If a
person seeks an interlocutory injunction, a three judge court is necessary
and direct obligatory appeal to the Supreme Court is provided for. The
same is true where a final hearing is held after the hearing for an inter-
locutory injunction has been had. But if a final hearing on the merits is
desired at the outset, a situation where the requirement of three judges and
direct appeal would seem most desirable, a single judge can dispose of the
case, and an appeal lies only to the Circuit Court of Appeals, with cortiorari
to the Supreme Court.
It is interesting to note that the limitations of Section 266 might also
be avoided if the federal courts entertained suits for declaratory judgments.
This was pointed out by Professor Borchard to a subcommittee of the
Senate Judiciary Committee in a hearing on the proposed Federal Declara.
tory Judgment Act. But the committee seemed to think this to be no
objection. HEARINGS ON H. R. 5623, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1929) 38-
39. However, the act has not been passed. And the Supreme Court has
ruled that the declaratory judgment procedure cannot be invoked in the
federal courts under the Conformity Act in those states which authorize
their courts to render declaratory judgments. Liberty Warehouse Co. v.
Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282 (1927); Comment (1927) 36 YALE
L. J. 845, 847.52 Cf. New York & Penn. Co. v. New York Cent. R. R., 281 Pa. 257, 126
Atl. 382 (1924). Often the state courts are allowed to examine only the
regularity of the proceedings in the commission's action. Chicago, M. &
St. P. Ry. v. P. U. Commission, 41 Idaho 181, 238 Pac. 970 (1925). Some
statutes provide that the administrative remedies provided by the commis-
sion must first be exhausted before appeal to the courts can be made.
Capital Water Co. v. P. U. Commission, 41 Idaho 19, 237 Pac. 423 (1925).
Such a provision makes it easy for a hostile commission to delay proceed-
ings indefinitely. Cf. Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 270 U. S. 587, 46 Sup.
Ct. 408 (1926). In Maine, failure to except from the orders of the com-
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narrowing of the scope of direct obligatory appeal to the
Supreme Court under Section 237 has led suitors to use every
available means to start their cases along the less tortuous route
that leads up from the decision of the district court in petitions
for injunctions. One way out of the difficulty is to abolish the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to grant injunctions to restrain
state activity53 This extreme view is supported by the argu-
ment that review by cediorra by the United States Supreme
Court of the decisions of the highest state courts affords ample
protection to constitutional rights. But this is questionable in
view of the lengthy procedure that would be necessary before
the Supreme Court could pass upon the validity of state action,
and of the serious damage that might be done in the interim
in cases where such action is declared unconstitutional. On the
other hand the present situation of ready interference with
local matters is equally undesirable. It is doubtful whether
legislation can secure the "happy medium." A realization by the
federal courts themselves that local matters are best left to the
states to determine, and their refusal to take jurisdiction except
in cases of strict "equitable necessity" and where the constitu-
tional question is a genuine and important issue will do much
to effect the result aimed at by Section 266. There is some
indication that such an attitude may be adopted5
THE SHAREHOLDER'S "INDIVIDUAL" SUIT
That the shareholder in a corporation is injured by a tortious
reduction of capital assets is obvious. It is equally apparent
that considerations of administrative convenience make it impos-
sible to allow each shareholder a separate right of suit. The
acts are therefore termed "corporate" wrongs and the courts
require that the corporation sue. To avoid injustice, however,
where the corporation refuses to sue, a shareholder is allowed
to bring a representative suit in behalf of himself and all other
shareholders., But, as a condition precedent, he must show an
mission is conclusive evidence of a waiver of the right. Devercaux v.
P. U. Commission, 125 Me. 520, 134 Atl. 545 (1926).
53 Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Pocr bctweCn Unitcd Statc, and
State Courts (1928) 13 CoRN. L. Q. 499.
54 See United States v. Hoboken, 29 F. (2d) 932, 936 (D. N. J. 1928).
'A glance at any set of general reports will show a striking number
of such suits. Cf. Glenn, The Stockholder's Suit-Corporate and Indi-
idual Grievawes (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 530; see Jones v. Johnson, 10 W.
P. D. Bush 649, 660-1 (Ky. 1874). It is clear that this, far from being a
disregard of the corporate entity theory, is a tacit recognition of it. The
shareholder enforces only a "derivative and representative" right. Glenn,
op. cit. svpra. "[The shareholder is] treated, for the time being, and for
the purposhs of the litigation, as the trustee and real representative of
the corporation, instead of its offending directorate, and majority stock-
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attempt, or the uselessness of an attempt, to induce the corpora-
tion, through its directorate, or through the shareholders in
meeting, to seek reparation.2 Judgment or decree in such a
suit is res adjudicata to all actions which may be instituted by
a shareholder or by the corporation to redress the same rights,
thus serving the policy against multiplicity of suits.
Three cases have recently arisen which raise the further prob-
lem of a suit by a shareholder in his individual capacity. In
each of the cases the court refused to apply the limitations of a
shareholder's representative suit to bar individual claims.
In Matter of Auditore,4 the defendant, the survivor of two
brothers, each of whom owned an equal share in a corporation,
was appointed administrator of the decedent's estate with a
surety company on his bond. The defendant, as director of the
corporation, diverted all of its assets in a period preceding and
following his appointment. The plaintiff, co-administratrix,
recovered judgment in a shareholder's representative suit.
Execution was returned unsatisfied. Upon the settlement of
accounts by the plaintiff, the court held the defendant and the
surety responsible to the extent of one half of the defalcations
for dereliction of duty, as administrator, in protecting the
estate's interest in the corporation. The theory of the case was
that, since the defendant, as administrator, owed a "separate
duty" to the estate to keep it intact, he could be sued in that
capacity. Two judges dissented.,
holders." Consumers' Ice and Coal Co. v. Security Bank and Trust Co.,
170 Ark. 530, 548, 280 S. W. 677, 683 (1926).
The equitable complaint may state facts which would call for relief at
law if the corporation sued. Moran v. Vreeland, 81 Misc. 664, 143 N. Y.
Supp. 522 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
The courts are liberal in construing complaints in shareholders' suits so
as to sustain the action. Cf. Kickbusch v. Ruggles, 105 S. C. 525, 90 S. E.
163 (1916) (prayer for damages for tort); MacLeod v. Miller, 201 N. Y.
Supp. 108 (Sup. Ct. 1923). But cf. Samuel v. Holladay, 21 Fed. Cas. 306
(C. C. Kan. 1869). Of course where the corporation could not recover,
the suit fails. Anderson v. Avey, 272 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921).
2 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450 (1881); Wenzel v. Brewing Company,
48 S. C. 80, 26 S. E. 1 (1896); cf. Sohland v. Baker, 141 Atl. 277 (Del.
1927); Schoening v. Schwenck, 112 Iowa 733, 84 N. W. 916 (1901).
S Cf. 6 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 4584; Dorrah v. Pemis-
cot Bank, 213 Mo. App. 541, 256 S. W. 560 (1923) (action denied where
eight suits by shareholders were pending). But of. Samuel v. Holladay,
supra note 1, at 312 (shareholder's representative suit denied because of
multiplicity of suits).
4249 N. Y. 335, 164 N. E. 242 (1928).
5 The Appellate Division had remitted the proceeding to the Surrogate's
Court for a determination of creditors' rights. Matter of Auditore, 223
App. Div. 654, 229 N. Y. Supp. 414 (2d Dep't 1928). The Court of Appeals
also ordered an investigation of the damage.
Judge Lehman's dissent, supra note 4, at 348, 164 N. E. at 245, denied
the existence of a-"separate duty." He said further: " ... I fail to see
COMMENTS
In Vierling v. Baxcter 6 a unanimous court allowed an individual
shareholder recovery in an action at law for conspiracy whereby
he was induced by fraudulent promises and representations to
assign control of a corporation to the defendants who converted
all the corporate property to the X Corporation. The elements
of damage were depriving the plaintiff of his control and diver-
sion of the corporate assets.
In a third case, Equitable Trust Co. v. Columbia Nat-l
Bank,7 the officers of the A Corporation who owned all but
twenty-five shares in the corporation and who were also officers
of the defendant Bank, transferred their shares to the Bank,
which took over all of the assets of the A Corporation in pay-
ment of an alleged indebtedness. The plaintiff, holder of the
twenty-five shares, sued the Bank for damages for conversion
of the corporate assets and was allowed recovery of the amount
paid in on the shares on the theory that the Bank had notice
of and became party to the legal fraud in "freezing out" the
plaintiff by taking all the assets of the A Corporation. Two
justices dissented.
As a general rule, for wrongs of the nature that appear in
these cases, the individual has no right of action; he may not
recover the consequent depreciation in the value of his shares.8
It is said that such injury is merely indirect and the damage is
a matter of reflex action; 9 recovery by the corporation heals
the shareholder's wounds. This is a logical attribute of the
shareholder's suit, as revealed in the leading case of Smfl v.
any sound ground for transmitting the injury done to the corporation into
an injury to the stockholder iff order to create a new liability against the
surety on the administrator's bond."
6141 Atl. 728 (Pa. 1928). See infra notes 19, 20.
7142 S. E. 811 (S. C. 1928). See infra note 21.
sHodge v. Meyer, 252 Fed. 479 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) (wrongful inter-
ference with contracts made on behalf of corporation); Wells v. Dane,
101 Me. 67, 63 Atl. 324 (1905) (wrongful issuance of shares); Rafferty
v. Donnelly, 197 Pa. 423, 47 Atl. 202 (1900) (recovery of salaries
paid); Dorrah v. Pemiscot Bank, spra note 3 (directors' negligence);
Greaves v. Gouge, 52 How. Pr. 58 (N. Y. 1876) (conversion of corporate
assets by officers); Gardiner v. Pollard, 10 Bosworth's Rep. 674 (N. Y.
Super. Ct. 1863) (same); Tomlinson v. Bricklayers' Union, 87 Ind. 303
(1882) (same); Hirsh v. Jones, 56 Fed. 137 (C. C. Tex. 1893) (wilful
waste by officers); Evans v. Brandon, 53 Tex. 56 (1SO) (imprudent
loans by bank directors); Latimer v. Richmond R. R., 39 S. C. 44, 17 S. E.
258 (1892); Niles v. N. Y. R. R., 176 N. Y. 119, 68 N. E. 142 (1903)
(majority wrecking corporation); Beeber v. Wilson, 285 Pa. 312, 131 Atl.
854 (1926) (for distribution of extraordinary fund); see 6 FLnTCHES,
CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (1919) § 4052; Canfield, The Scope and
Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory (1917) 17 COL. L. REv. 128, 129.
9 See Glenn, op. cit. supra note 1, at 584. The "direct and pro.dmate
consequence of a wrong done to the securities should be rectified by an
appropriate suit on the part of the corporation." See Hodge v. Meyer,
supra note 8, at 483.
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Hurd,'0 wherein the Massachusetts court, regarding the matter
as one of first impression, denied an individual action on the
theory that the injury was "corporate."
In this same case, however, dictum appears to the effect that
a "separate and peculiar interest" of the shareholder would be
protected."' Where such interest is entirely independent of that
of the corporation, the individual's capacity to sue would seem
clear. Thus it has been held that representations by directors
inducing a sale of shares at too low a price are actionable by
individual shareholders.2 And it has been intimated 13 that a
like result would be reached where spurious shares were issued,
or an unlawful tax assessed on the shares, or where a share
certificate was mutilated.
The difficulty arises where the act alleged to be a violation ot
the shareholder's individual kight is concededly actionable by
the corporation. The instant cases fall within this category.
The Auditore case employs the "separate duty" concept which
is said to have been first articulated in General Rubber Co. v.
Benedict."4 There the defendant, a director of the plaintiff cor-
poration which was the majority shareholder of the X Corpora-
tion, failed to notify the plaintiff that funds of the X Cor-
poration were being misappropriated to the use of an enterprise
in which he had an interest. The defendant was held for a
10 12 Metc. 371 (Mass. 1847). The court reasoned that "the fact that
similar grievances have existed to a great extent, and in numberless
instances, where such an action would have presented an obvious and
effective remedy, affords strong proof, that in view of all such suffering
parties and their legal advisers and guides, there was no principle on
which such an action can be maintained." Ibid. 383. The action was on
the case against the directors for mismanagement whereby the bank failed.
"Ibid. 386. The interest here referred to was that represented by the
certificate. Trover or trespass for the conversion of the certificate, trespass
on the case for refusing to make a proper transfer, and assumpsit for a
dividend declared were stated to be maintainable by the individual share-
holer.
12 Porter v. Healey, 244 Pa. 427, 91 Atl. 428 (1914). The plaintiffs
were allowed to recover a bonus paid to directors who, by their statements
that they were being paid just what the other shareholders were getting,
induced the plaintiff to sell their shares. Here there was no cause of
action in the corporation. See Niles v. N. Y. R. R., supra note 8, at 123,
68 N. E. at 144.
13 See Greaves v. Gouge, supra note 8, at 60; Wells v. Dane, supra note 8,
at 71, 63 Atl. at 325; Seitz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 88, 181 N. W. 102,
105 (1921).
Another wide group of cases where a representative suit is not necessary
includes suits involving maintenance of preferential security positions,
Such actions are brought against the corporation, not in its behalf. See
4 CooK, ConroRATIoNs (8th ed. 1923) 3184-3186.
'4 215 N. Y. 18, 109 N. E. 96 (1915) (4-2 decision affirming 3-2 decision
in the Appellate Division); see (1929) 42 HARe. L. REV. 705; Note (1915),
28 HARv. L. Rav. 409; L. R. A. 1915F 617.
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violation of his duty as director. The case has been criticized
as an unnecessary departure from the rule of Smith v. Hurd.I0
It has nevertheless been followed.17 A valid objection may be
made to this solution of the difficulty: that the "separate duty"
is too much the variable.' s
The Vierling case suggests no new approach. Like the Audi-
tore case, it recognizes the corporate cause of action but upholds
the right to sue for wrongs which affect the individual. Undue
emphasis is put on the fact that there has been a conspiracy to
injure the plaintiff. 9 The confusion as to the elements of dam-
age should be noted.20
15 Ritchie v. McMullen, 79 Fed. 522 (C. C. A. 6th, 1897) has been quite
generally cited in support of the proposition advanced in the Benedict
case. There the plaintiff shareholder pledged his shares with the defendant
directors. To "freeze him out" the directors combined and wilfully re-
duced the value of his shares so that they could buy in at a public Cale.
The defendants were held directly liable to the plaintiff.
In an earlier New York case where the defendant directors, by commit-
ting -waste, induced the plaintiff to sell out in belief that no dividends
-would be paid, the defendants were held for their "fraud." Von Au v.
Magenheimer, 126 App. Div. 257, 110 N. Y. Supp. 629 (2d Dep't 190),
af'd without opinion, 196 N. Y. 510, 89 N. E. 1114 (1909). In his opinion,
126 App. Div. at 26T, 110 N. Y. Supp. at 636, Miller, J. states:
"In view of the conditions under which business is now conducted, it
will be very unfortunate if it shall be held that the duty of corporate
managers in respect of their conduct of the corporate affairs is solely to
the corporate entity, and that, however great a designed injury to an
individual stockholder may be, he can only get redress through the
corporation."
It may be conceded that in these two cases it would be very "unfor-
tunate"-in view of the fact that the shareholders had already been
"frozen out" and could not bring representative actions. Theze cases,
however, do not present situations where the corporate and individual
wrongs are identical.
16 See Note (1915) 28, HARv. L. Rv. 409, .11. The case has also been
termed an extension of the "rule, which holds the agent only as to matters
arising within the scope of his agency." See (1915) 25 YU L. J. 154.
:17 Keating v. Hammerstein, 125 Misc. 334, 209 N. Y. Supp. 769 (Sup.
Ct. 1921); cf. Brock v. Poor, 216 N. Y. 387, 111 N. E. 229 (1915) (dis-
tinguishing the Benedict case). But cf. Von Boskerck v. Aronson, 197 N.
Y. Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (individual shareholder's demand for dam-
ages for breach of director's promise to conduct properly corporate affairs
denied; Benedict case not cited) ; (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 498.
is Under a logical application of the concept any "separate" right-duty
relationship would sustain a cause of action. For example, where directors
are termed "fiduciaries," logically, as many individual cestuis could sue
as would care to. The unlimited extent of such an application is evident.
I9 The court e-xpressly assumes conspiracy to allow recovery on at least
some of the plaintiff's claims. But see Lukach v. Blair, 108 Blisc. 20, 21,
178 N. Y. Supp. 8, 10 (Sup. Ct. 1919): "By adopting the expedient of
alleging that the corporate acts performed by the defendants were per-
formed pursuant to a conspiracy, plaintiff cannot overturn the established
principles of law relating to derivative actions."
20 The plaintiff is, under any theory, entitled to his personal damages
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The result in the Equitable Trust case, as indicated in the
minority opinion, seems to follow from a misunderstanding of
the theory of the shareholder's representative suit. The court,
after expounding the rule that the corporation must enforce
corporate rights but that, on refusal, the shareholder may do so
in a yepresentative capacity, proceeds to allow the individual
suit. The much italicized dissenting opinion reiterates the or-
thodox rule and points out the evils of the course of the
majority.-
From the various legal principles expounded in the cases only
one proposition emerges as a definite approach to this problem
of remedy for grievances which are at the same time "corporate"
and "individual." That is the "separate duty" concept as found
in the New York cases. But it is open to several objections,
among which are its indefiniteness, 22 the difficulty of computing
damages)23 the policy against multiplicity of suits 2-1 and the
uncertainty of protection of creditors' rights.25
Viewed on their facts the instant cases may be approved on
the ground that in each case the plaintiff is the only person
accruing out of his being induced to surrender control. His rights with
respect to this do not collide with corporate interests.
21 Upon investigation it was found that not one of the authorities cited
sanctioned the ijdividual suit. They all referred to shareholders' repre-
sentative actions. This was indicated in the dissenting opinion of Cochran,
J., who also points out the error of allowing a cause of action for "conver-
sion of real estate," and the possibility of a huge number of suits if the
rule of the case be logically applied. Equitable Trust Co. v. Columbia
Nat'l Bank, supra note 7, at 825-826.
As to the talk of the court about "de facto dissolution" the authoritioe
are not clear as to what happens on dissolution. Cf. Brock v. Poor, supra
note 17 (no individual suit while corporation exists); (1924) 8 MiNN. L.
REv. 348 (stating that a representative suit is in many cases necessary
even where the corporation is legally dissolved). But of. dissent of Sea-
bury, J. in Brock v. Poor, supra note 17, at 415-16, 111 N. E. at 239
(arguing that defendants were estopped to set up the corporate entity
which they had kept alive contrary to their agreement); Brown v. Deposit
Nat'l Bank, 125 Misc. 247, 211 N. Y. Supp. 366 (Sup. Ct. 1925) (trustee
in bankruptcy of shareholder may sue for portion of fund in hands of
defendants as trustee for dissolution of the corporation); see Glenn, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 593-596.
22Supra note 18.
23 For instance, if several of the individuals harmed recovered damages
while others did not and a representative suit was later brought, there
would be great difficulty in computing the damages. The same difficulty
would be encountered in determining the damages accruing to a single
individual. However, this factor has not deterred those courts which
incline favorably to the "individual" suit. Cf. Gardiner v. Pollard, supra
note 8, at 690; Higgins v. Applebaum, 186 App. Div. 682, 686-87, 174 N.
Y. Supp. 807, 810 (1st Dep't 1919).
24Supra note 3; see Eldred v. Ripley, 97 Ill. App. 503, 507-508 (1901).




interested in enforcing the cause of action against the wrong-
doers. 26  In such situations a representative suit may well be
deemed unnecessary since the administrative necessity which is
the basis of the rule requiring a single action in the corporate
right is satisfied.27 However, the rationalization in terms of
"separate duty" is obviously broader than the situation requires.
It is open to the danger of application to cases not falling within
the category of the instant fact situations. 8
THE POWER OF AN APPELLATE COURT TO DISPOSE OF A CASE
WITHOUT REMANDING
Among the various devices which have been developed to re-
lieve the courts of the congestion which is so great a problem
to-day, is that of giving to an appellate court the power finally
to dispose of a case without remanding it to a lower court. At
common-law, in general, an appellate court could only affrm or
reverse a case coming to it.' It has often happened, however,
that an appellate court finds that the trial court should have
directed a verdict, one way or the other. In such a case,
remanding the case to the trial court for a new trial, and a
directed verdict, seems an unnecessary multiplication of judicial
acts. To avoid this unnecessary remanding, some states have,
by statute, authorized appellate courts, when a directed verdict
was erroneously refused below, to enter such a directed verdict,
and to render judgment on it, unless, of course, there is some
other phase of the case which necessitates a retrial.2
Such a provision came before the United States Supreme
2 GIn the Auditore case, the plaintiff and defendant represented all the
share interests; in the Vierling case, as in the Equitable Trust case, the
plaintiff appears to be the only shareholder not in privity v:ith the
wrongdoers.
27 Since the difficulty of computing damages and the necessity of pro-
tecting creditors' rights, under such facts, are the only practical objections
to an individual recovery, and since the judicial machinery is sufficient in
itself to meet such obstacles, the individual relief should be given.
28 Cf. (1924) 8 MINN. L. REV. 348, 349, pointing out that such a "short-
cut to justice" has its dangers: "once the right is established, it is not
easy to confine it to particular facts."
It has been suggested that the "individual" plaintiff aver in his complaint
the non-responsibility of the defendant to the corporation and if issue is
joined on the question of responsibility that the personal action be stayed
until a trial of the corporate right. See Note (1915) 28 HARM. L. REV.
409, 411, n. 12. This is open to the objection that it does not take care
of the "hard case" where the responsibility to the corporation is apparent.
1 See Sunderland, The Scope of Judicial Review (1929) 27 MIcH. L. RMv.
416 for a historical description and suggested explanation for the develop-
ment of appellate practice in common-law courts.
2 MA:s. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 231, §§ 122, 123; MINN. STAT. (Mason 1927)
§ 9495; PA. STAT. (1920) § 17292; and see statutes cited infra notes 6, 8.
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Court in New York Life Ins., Co. v. Slocum.3 In the district
court, in an action on an insurance policy, the defendant's request
for a verdict directed in his favor had been refused, and there
had been a trial to a jury, with a verdict for the plaintiff. The
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the verdict should have been
directed for the defendant, and following the state statute under
the Conformity Act, directed the verdict, and entered judgment
for the defendant upon it. The Supreme Court reversed this hold-
ing on the grounds that, since the issue had once gone to the jury,
an appellate court could not enter a final judgment contrary to
the finding of the jury without violating the jury trial safeguard
of the Seventh Amendment. 4 It would seem that if the court
finds that the issue should never have been left to the jury, the
safeguard is not violated by a final judgment in an appellate
court merely because the issue was erroneously given to a jury.
And on these grounds, the state courts have upheld such provi-
sions, refusing to follow the Slocum case.'
Such provisions, however, are of but limited application, and
of themselves only a minor remedy. Of greater scope, and of
greater effect as a remedy for the unnecessary complications of
appellate practice, are those provisions in many states which
provide in general language that an appellate court may, when-
ever possible, render final judgment on the caseY This pro-
vision, when coupled with the usual powers of an appellate court
both in law and in equity cases, gives not only the powers of
the type of statute first mentioned, but also allows final deter-
mination in any case in which the appellate court thinks that
sending the case back would amount to having purely formal
proceedings taken7
Beyond this, there are many statutes which provide that
where the findings of fact of the trial court are assigned as
error, the appellate court may make new findings and render
3228 U. S. 364, 33 Sup. Ct. 523 (1912).
4For a keen criticism of this view see Schofield, New Tiial ,and 'tho
Seventh Amendment (1913) 8 ILL. L. REV. 287, 381, 465.
5 Bothwell v. Boston Elevated Co., 215 Mass. 467, 102 N. E. 665 (1913);
Kernan v. St. Paul City Ry., 64 Minn. 312, 67 N. W. 71 (1896).
6ARLz. RBu. STAT. (1913) § 1268; FLA. Coi '. LAws (1927) § 4637; ILL.
REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 110, §§ 110-111; IOWA CODE: (1927) §§ 12871,
14010; KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 60, § 3317; MASS. GEN. LAWS
(1921) c. 231, §§ 124, 125; Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) § 1514; MONT. REV. CODE
(1921) § 8805; N. Y. C. P. A. (1921) § 584; N. C. CODE (1927) § 1412;
TENN. CODE (Shannon, 1918) § 4902; TEX. COMPLETE STAT. (1928) §§ 1771,
1856, 1857; WASH. COMP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 1737; WYO. CoiP.
STAT. (1920) § 6387.
7For example, where a verdict should have been directed below, but no
request was made for such direction, the appellate court may enter final
judgment nevertheless. Miller v. Union Indemnity Co., 209 App. Div. 455,
204 N. Y. Supp. 730 (4th Dep't 1924).
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final judgment on them." Even if it is not provided expressly
in the statute that cases tried to a jury shall not be included
within its scope, it is universally held that if the findings of
fact were made below by a jury, the constitutional jury safe-
guard prohibits the appellate court from substituting its own
findings on appealY
While the wording of these statutes is quite uniform, with
minor variations of course, the liberality with which they have
been interpreted, and the scope which has been allowed to appel-
late courts under them varies. It would seem of value to under-
take an examination of the North Dakota provision, which has
been quite narrowly construed, of the Alabama provision, which
has been more liberally applied, and of the English provision,
which is the broadest in scope and usefulness.
The North Dakota provision 0 reads:
"... a party desiring to appeal from a judgment . . . (in
an action tried by the court 'but without a jury') . . . shall
cause a statement of the case to be settled . . . (as provided
elsewhere by statute) . . . and shall specify therein the ques-
tions of fact that he desires the supreme court to review, and all
questions of fact not so specified shall be deemed on appeal to
have been properly decided by the trial court. Only such evi-
dence as relates to the questions of fact to be reviewed shall be
embodied in this statement. But if the appellant shall specify
in the statement that he desires to review the entire case, all
the evidence and proceedings shall be embodied in the statement.
The supreme court shall try anew the question of fact specified
in the statement or in the entire case, if the appellant demands
a retrial of the entire case, and shall finally dispose of the same
whenever justice can be done without a new trial, and either
affirm or modify the judgment or direct a new judgment to be
entered in the district court; the supreme court may, however,
•. :. order a new trial 'of the action . . . provided that the pro-
visions of this section shall not apply to actions properly triable
with a jury."
The limitation on the applicability of this statute imposed by
the proviso that it shall not apply to "actions properly triable
with a jury" does not seem quite clear. It is obvious that the
8 ALA. CODE (1928) §§ 6149, 9502; CAL. CODES MND GE:N. LAWS (Supp.
1927) § 956a; IND. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 723; MoNT. REv. CODE (1921)
§ 8805 (as to equity suits); NEB. Co tP. STAT. (1922) §§ 9150, 9151
(equity); N. D. ComP. LAws (Supp. 1926) § 7846; OE. Co.sT. Art. VIIr,
§ 3c; Rules of the English Supreme Court, Order 58, r. 4, ANxuAL Pn,%cric
(1928) 1186 et seq.; YEARLY PRACTiCE (1928) 1160 et seq.
9 A good discussion of this point is found in Mirich -. Forschner Co., 312
IlI. 343, 143 N. E. 846 (1924) interpreting ILL. R V. STAT. (Cahill, 1927)
c. 110, § 110. For other cases see First Nat'l Bank v. Crawford, 78 Neb.
665, 111 N. W. 587 (1907); Wigfield v. Akridge, 207 Ala. 560, 93 So. 612
(1922).
' N. D. Comp. LAws (Supp. 1926) § 7846.
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provision applies to equity cases where no jury, is called in.
However, when a jury is called in an equity case, even though
in a purely advisory capacity, the provision for trial de novo
is held to be inapplicable." The generalization might be drawn
from this that the proviso merely 'Operated to exclude cases
where, in the trial court, a jury was in fact employed. How-
ever, it is held that where, in the trial court, a jury which might
have been claimed has been waived, the retrial provision is also
inapplicable.12 In fact, the provision apparently does not en-
large the scope of appellate review at all, in law cases, with
regard to the review of facts. In cases where a jury has been
waived below, the appellate court will review the findings of fact
from the trial court, but uniformly the appellate court has said
that the findings will not be overturned unless it is clearly
against the weight of the evidence, 13 which seems hardly more
than the usual powers of an appellate court. No case was found
in which the facts as found by the trial court were overturned.
The operation of the statute, therefore, seems to be to limit as
much as to enlarge the scope of appellate action. It cuts out
equity cases where a jury was used, and in other equity cases
allows discretionary 14 final determination without remanding
where special findings of fact1 are specified on appeal. It has
further been held to apply only to appeals from final judgments,
which are before the appellate court for review.'0 The purpose
of such a statute is obviously to eliminate as far as possible,
without infringing upon the jury safeguard, an appellate court's
sending a case back to another trial when the whole matter
could be settled in the appellate court. It seems unfortunate,
therefore, that this section was not held to apply to any case
not in fact tried to a jury.17 It is possible that a different inter-
pretation would have been reached were. the pressure of work
on the courts greater than it is in North Dakota.
1 People's Bank v. Lee, 55 N. D. 42, 212 N. W. 439 (1927).
12 Novak v. Lovin, 33 N. D. 424, 157 N. W. 297 (1916) ; State Bank v.
Maier, 34 N. D. 259, 158 N. W. 346 (1916) ; Lloyd Mortgage Co. v. Davis,
51 N. D. 336, 199 N. W. 869 (1924) ; Quinn Works v. Boyd, 52 N. D. 273,
202 N. W. 852 (1924); Baird v. Abraham, 55 N. D. 348, 213 N. W. 733
(1927).
'3 See cases cited supra note 12. In retrial of equity cases there is a
presumption of correctness in the trial court, although less strong. Of.
Williston v. Ludowese, 53 N. D. 797, 208 N. W. 82 (1926).
'
4 Wilke v. Merchants Bank, 55 N. D. 603, 215 N. W. 77 (1927). See
infra note 24.
15 Lunde v. Irish, 50 N. D. 312, 195 N. W. 825 (1923).
16 Dale v. Duffy, 44 N. D. 33, 176 N. W. 97 (1919) ; Marquette Ins. Co.
v. McCutcheon, 54 N. D. 596, 211 N. W. 433 (1926).
17 Cf. IND. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 723 where the exclusion of cases "1trl-
able to a jury" from the operation of the statute is held to make the pro-
vision applicable to equity suits only. Parkison v. Thompson, 164 Ind. 609,
73 N. E. 109 (1905); Mills v. Thomas, 194 Ind. 648, 144 N. E. 412 (1924).
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Alabama has had on its books since 1907 1 a provision giving
the appellate court power finally to dispose of the case. In
tracing its development in that state, however, it is necessary
to look into the provisions relating to waiving jury trial, for
the provision applies where a jury has been waived. It was
first provided that when a jury was waived, and no special find-
ing of fact was made by the trial court, the general finding of
the trial court should have the same authority as a jury verdict.'
This provision was retained in the code of 1907, which first
introduced a provision for a review of the findings on appeal,
and the rendition of a judgment thereon. For this reason, the
provision for final judgment on appeal was allowed to apply
only to "equity" cases, and to cases where a special finding of
fact had been made, on the application of one of the parties, and
where a jury had been waived. 0 However, by 1915, the require-
ment of a special finding below had been dropped, and it is not
found in the latest code. 21 Therefore in any case in which there
was in fact no jury below, the appellate court may review the
findings of the lower court, and may make another finding, and
enter judgment upon it.22 This has been done even in a criminal
case.- But this rendition of judgment is discretionary, and the
IALA. CODE (1907) §§ 5359-61. ,The present provisions (AmA. CODE
(1928) §§ 6149, 9502) read: "§ 6149. The appellate court may, upon the re-
versal of any judgment or decree, remand the same for further proceedings,
or render such judgment or decree as the court below should have rendered,
when the record enables it to do so." "§ 9502. In the trial of any cause
without a jury in addition to the questions which may be under the existing
laws presented to the supreme court for review, either party to the cause
may, by bill of exceptions, also present for review the conclusions and judg-
ments of the court on the evidence that the supreme court shall review the
same without any presumption in favor of the court below on the evidence,
and if there be error, shall render such judgment in the cause as the court
below should have rendered, or reverse and remand the same for further
proceedings in said court as the supreme court may deem right. The find-
ing of the court on the facts shall be subject to review without an excep-
tion thereto."
19A CODE (1896) § 3319.
20 First Bank v. Mayfield Mills, 146 Ala. 610, 40 So. 954 (1906) (no
special finding made); Allen v. Scruggs, 190 Ala. 654, 67 So. 301 (1914)
semble; cf. Betancourt v. Eberlin, 71 Ala. 461 (1882) (finding of judge
when jury waived equal to jury verdict).
A trial below on agreed facts was equivalent to a special finding. Bas-
sett v. Powell, 178 Ala. 340, 60 So. 88 (1912).
21 See supra note 18.
2 2 Pinckard v. Cassels, 195 Ala. 353, 70 So. 153 (1915) (evidence re-
viewed, finding below reversed-jury had been waived); Cochran v.
Leonard, 204 Ala. 163, 85 So. 693 (1920) ; Montgomery Light Co. v. Woods,
194 Ala. 329, 70 So. 119 (1915); Farmers' Bank & Trust Co. v. Shut &
Keihn, 192 Ala. 53, 68 So. 363 (1915); Twin Tree Lumber Co. v. Ensign,
193 Ala. 113, 69 So. 525 (1915); see Jones v. Hines, 205 Ala. 145, 14G, 87
So. 531 (1920).
23Corcoran v. State, 18 Ala. App. 202, 89 So. 835 (1921).
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appellate court still may remand the case, if it so desires.24
The court will only review, however, what is included in the
bill of exceptions.25 Thus it will be seen that under a broad
provision a liberal interpretation will enable the appellate court
in many cases coming to it 26 to settle a case finally while it is
passing upon the correctness of the trial below.
California recently, in 1927, passed the most far-reaching
American provision for appellate disposition of a case. The
statute27 was passed following an amendment to the Constitu-
tion,28 ratified in ,1926, making it possible. The statute, in brief,
provides that in all cases "where a jury is not a matter of right,
or where jury has been waived" the appellate court may make
findings of fact contrary to, or in addition to, those made by
the trial court, and may take new evidence of events any time
before decision, and may make final judgment. The statute ex-
pressly declares that it is to be construed liberally to avoid
retrials. The statute has already been used frequently, 5 but
in view of its obvious modelling on the English Rules of Court
the development in England may be of greater interest than a
study of the very recent California provision.
The English provision reads: 30
"The Court of Appeal shall have ... the full discretionary
power to receive further evidence on questions of fact, such evi-
dence to be taken either by oral examination in court, by
affidavit, or by deposition taken before an examiner or commis-
sioner. Such further evidence may be given without special
leave upon interlocutory applications, or in any case as to mat-
ters which have occurred after the date of the decision from
which the appeal is brought. Upon appeal from a judgment
after trial or hearing of any cause or matter upon the merits,
such further evidence (except as above) shall be admitted on
24 Ex parte Kemp, 203 Ala. 467, 83 So. 485 (1919); Munson S. S. Line
v. Horace Turner Co., 202 Ala. 574, 81 So. 76 (1919). For discussion of
discretionary nature of such provisions see J. J. G., Fact Finding Power of
Appellate Courts of California (1928) 16 CALIF. L. RE.V. 500, 504 ct scq.
25 Consolidated Motor Co. v. Malik, 207 Ala. 120, 92 So. 262 (1922);
Bridgman v. Doss, 9 Ala. App. 615, 64 So. 173 (1913) (bill must show
finding below).
26 In Alabama, jury is waived unless specially asked for within a certain
time. ALA. CODE (1928) §§ 8593-95, 8597. Similar provisions designed to
:make jury waiving more common are found in some other states. CONN.
GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5752; N. Y. C. P. A. (1921) § 426.
27 CAL. CODES AND GEN. LAW (Supp. 1927) § 956a.
2 8 CAL. CONsT. Art. VI, § 4%.
29 For collections of recent California cases applying this section see J.
J. G., Fact Finding Power of Appellate Courts of California, vupra note
24, at 509 et seq.; (1928) 1 So. CALIF. L. REv. 387; CAL. J U. Sup. (1928)
187 et seq.
30 Order 58, r. 4, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 1186 et seq.; YEAnLY PRAcTIc"
(1928) 1160 et seq.
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special grounds only, and not without special leave of court.
The Court of Appeal shall have power to draw inferences of
fact, and to give any judgment or make any order which ought
to have been made . .."
The Rule further provides for admitting evidence on partial
appeals, or in favor of the appellee as well as the appellant.
One feature, which is to be noted in comparison with the
American provision, is the absence of any reservation as to jury
cases. Of course, there is no constitutional guaranty of jury
trial in England in the sense that there is in America; however.
the practice under the Order seems to be that when there has
been a jury verdict below, the appellate court hesitates to make
findings of fact counter to the jury's finding. The English pro-
vision can best be discussed by treating the question of the
admission of new evidence in connection with the power to give
final judgment. The rule is said to be that if evidence could
have been, but was not, submitted below to the jury, it will not
be admitted on appeal. Where, however, the appellate court,
allowing for the presumption of correctness always accorded the
trial court,32 thinks that there could be only one reasonable find-
ing of fact, the court will make its own finding, and give final
judgment.3 3 Where there was no jury below, the court is more
ready to draw its own inferences of fact.3'
As to the admission of new evidence on appeal, the practice
of the court seems to be cautious, although new evidence is often
admitted.3 5 The provisions for admitting new evidence without
special leave are strictly construed.-  As has been suggested,
especially where there has been a jury, the court will not admit
new evidence which, with diligence, could have been presented
below.37 When new evidence is to be admitted, notice of its
production must be given the opponent party.P It is possible,
though not usual, to have witnesses subpoenaed to give evidence
on appeal.39 The procedure under the Rules of Court is open in
31 Nash v. Rochford Rural Council, [1917] 1 K. B. 384; cf. MacDougall
v. Knight, 14 App. Cas. 194 (1889).
32 Coghlan v. Cumberland, [1898] 1 Ch. D. 704; Colonial Securities
Trust Co. v. Mlassey, [1896] 1 Q. B. 38.
33 Winterbotham & Co. v. Sibthorp, [1918] 1 K. B. 625; Banbury v. Bank
of Montreal, [1918] A. C. 626.
31 Coghlan v. Cumberland, supra note 32.
35 In re Chennell, 8 Ch. D. 492 (1878) (any evidence not heard below
is eligible, but court should be cautious); Bigsby v. Dickinson, 4 Ch. D.
24 (1876) (evidence received).
36 In re Compton, 27 Ch. D. 392 (1884).
37 See cases cited supra note 31.
3 8 Hastie v. Hastie, 1. Ch. D. 562 (1876) ; Justice v. Mersey Steel & Iron
Co., 24 W. R. 199 (1875); INDEBAUR, BANuAL OF P aA Cc (10th ed. 1919)
349.
39 In re Coal Economizing Co., 24 W. R. 36 (1875); Regina v. Rourke,
56 J. P. 292 (1891).
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criminal cases by reason of a provision in the criminal code
which opens to criminal cases all practices used in civil cases.,,
The North Dakota statute noted above also provides: 4
"On appeal in the supreme court in any action tried by the
court without a jury, if it appears that material evidence was
excluded, the supreme court may issue a mandate to the lower
court to take such evidence, and proceedings will be stayed while
it is returned."
No cases were found, however, in North Dakota in which this
procedure was employed. Provisions for the taking of new evi-
dence in appellate courts are found in the statutes of a few other
states.4 2
A broad provision like that recently adopted in California
seems to be the most useful. In view of the congestion in so
many courts of this country, any means that will enable the
courts to clear their dockets of cases with a minimum of judicial
procedure is to be advocated. In "equity" cases, since the appel-
late court so frequeitly reviews the facts anyway, the power to
make a final determination will cut out a duplication of pro-
ceedings in many cases. Since it must be recognized that it
would not be wise to make a complete retrial of every case in the
appellate court the usual procedure, this can be avoided by mak-
ing the'review of facts, and the remanding to a trial court, a
matter in the discretion of the appellate court. The same con-
siderations would seem to apply in the cases where jury has been
waived in the trial court. We may trust appellate courts not
to usurp the functions of the trial court.
The provision for the admission of new evidence on appeal
also seems desirable. In those states where it has been allowed,
and in England, the practice seems to be that such evidence is
not very often resorted to, and if the provision is applied so as to
avoid allowing a disappointed litigant to bolster up his case on
appeal, it may be of great value in those cases where the only
grounds for remanding are that facts have come to light since
trial which put a new complexion on the case.
CONVICTION OF ONE DEGREE OF AN OFFENSE AS ACQUITTAL OF ALL
HIGHER DEGREES
One of the questions that has arisen in connection with the
constitutional provision 2 that no person shall be placed in jeop-
40 Rex v. Robinson, [1917] 2 K. B. 108.
41 Supra note 10.
42 CAL. CODES AND GEN. LAWS (Supp. 1927) § 956a; KAN. REv. STAT.
ANN. (1923) c. 60, § 3316; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 231, § 125; MIC10.
CoLIP. LAWS (1915). § 12034; N. J. CollOP. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1925) §§
163-304; N. C. CODE (1927) § 1414; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 4963 (ex-
pressly limited to equity); see (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 570.
IU. S. CONST. AMEND. V.
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ardy twice for the same offense is whether, when a conviction is
reversed and a new trial granted,2 the defendant can raise the
plea of former jeopardy as to all offenses of a higher degree than
that of which he was formerly convicted. For example, suppose
A to be on trial for murder. Upon a conviction of manslaughter,
he appeals and the case is sent back for a new trial. May he,
at the second trial, contend that the manslaughter verdict oper-
ated as an acquittal of murder? If so what will be the effect
(a) of trying the defendant anew upon the original indictment;
(b) of introducing evidence at the second trial which would tend
to establish the commission of the higher offense; (c) of con-
victing the defendant of murder on the second trial?
In the recent case of Carb nell v. People of Porto Rico,3 the
defendant was indicted for murder and convicted of man-
slaughter. On appeal, the judgment was reversed and the cause
remanded. At a second trial on the original indictment, the de-
fendant pleaded the former conviction as an acquittal of all
offenses higher than manslaughter, and hence as a bar to further
prosecution for murder. The plea was overruled and the defend-
ant was again convicted of manslaughter. On writ of error, the
defendant alleged, inter alia, double jeopardy. The court, rely-
ing on the rule of United St4.tes v,. Trono,4 affi-med the con-
viction.
The defendant's contention in the Carbonell case would have
been supported in some states, notably in California. A court
there has gone so far as to grant a writ of prohibition to prevent
a second trial on the original indictment, even though the court
had ruled that a conviction could be had for no higher offenses
than on the first trial.2
Where the doctrine prevailing is that a conviction of a smaller
offense operates as an acquittal of all higher offenses, the effect
of admitting evidence on the second trial which would support a
conviction for a higher offense presents an interesting question.
The only cases which have been found on this point arose in
Florida and their results are apparently in conflict. In Wcst v.
2 Of course, the plea of double jeopardy is not available as a defense to
all further prosecution on a new trial, where such new trial has been pro-
cured by the defendant's motion or appeal. State v. Slack, 6 Ala. G70
(1844); Johnson v. State, 29 Ark. 31 (1874); People v. Clinton, 78 Cal.
App. 451, 248 Pac. 929 (1926).
3 27 F. (2d) 253 (C. C. A. 1st, 1923).
4 199 U. S. 521, 26 Sup. Ct. 121 (1905). In this case, the defendant had
been convicted of an assault after being tried on an indictment for murder.
On appeal of the defendant to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands,
the court reversed the conviction of assault and the defendant was then
convicted of murder in the second degree. This action was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Huntington v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 288, 90 Pac. 141 (1907).
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State,6 where the defendant was convicted on the first trial of
manslaughter, the admission in a later trial of evidence tending
to show premeditation was held to be reversible error. In the
second case,7 after a conviction for assault with intent to commit
murder in the second degree, the fact that some of the evidence
admitted on the second trial might have been interpreted as
showing premeditated intent was held not to be error. In both
cases the trial was expressly confined to the grade of the offense
of which the defendant was formerly convicted, but the discrep-
ancy in result may possibly be explained by the fact that in the
latter case the potential penalty for each of the two grades of
the offense was the same.8  The court points out this fact, and
goes on to say: 9
S..and on a subsequent trial that is expressly confined
to an assault with intent to commit murder in the second degree,
an intent to commit the felony must be shown to accompany the
assault, and in proving the intent, it may not be error to admit
evidence of the circumstances incident to the assault that may
tend to show a premeditated design to kill as well as an intent to
kill by perpetrating an act imminently dangerous to another and
evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although
without any premeditated design to kill any individual."
The court was no doubt cognizant, of the practical difficulties of
proving any sort of "intent," and its decision to dispense with
hair-splitting seems desirable, particularly under the facts of
this case.
Cases which actually result at the second trial in convictions
for a higher degree of the offense are rare. In some states, there
is considerable dicta to the effect that such a verdict would not
be allowed. 10 An Arkansas case has expressly so held, basing its
decision upon an interpretation of the state constitution and
code.- A Virginia court has reached the same result,12 arguing
6 55 Fla. 200, 46 So. 93 (1908).
7 Thomas v. State, 85 Fla. 113, 95 So. 752 (1923).
a FLA. REv. GEN. STAT. (1920). § 5063 provides that an assault to com-
mit a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment is punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 20 years. See also ibid. § 5035 making
murder in the first degree punishable by death and murder in the second
degree punishable bir life imprisonment.
9 See Thomas v. State, supra note 7, at 117, 95 So. at 754.
20 See Thornton v. State, 18 Ala. App. 225, 227, 90 So. 66, 68 (1921);
State v. Bridges, 149 La. 844, 846, 90 So. 217 (1921); Brown v. State, 99
Tex. Cr. 19, 22, 267 S. W. 493, 494 (1925).
11 Johnson v. State, supra note 2. The Bill of Rights provided that "no
person having been once acquitted by a jury for the same offense shall be
again put in jeopardy. . . " In vie-w of this, a code provision that a
new trial placed the parties in the same position as if no trial bad been had
was held inoperative as to offenses of which he had been acquitted.
12 Stuart v. Commonwealth, 28 Gratt. 950 (Va. 1877). See opinion of
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that had the defendant been indicted on one count for murder
and on another for manslaughter, an express acquittal on the
murder count would effectively bar any subsequent conviction
therefor. The court considered that the result should be the same
where a conviction for a smaller offense operates as an implied
acquittal of higher offenses. Apparently, in spite of subsequent
waverings, this is still the state of the law in Virginia."
Such a view is faultless in its academic logic, but it is sharply
challenged by practical aspects of the problem," and it may be
wholly upset by discarding the premise that a conviction of
one offense is for all purposes an acquittal of any higher offense.
Trono v. United States 1" squarely holds that where the defend-
ant appeals he may on a new trial be convicted of a higher
offense than on the first trial because the appeal is a "waiver" of
the right to plead former jeopardy. A recent Mississippi case10
explains a similar holding by construing a provision of a state
statute, that "there must be an actual acquittal or conviction on
the merits to bar another prosecution," as not to include "con-
structive" acquittals as such a bar. Undoubtedly courts which
hold that a new trial places all the issues before the jury anew
Staples, J. at 962: "'When the jury say the defendant is guilty of man-
slaughter, they affirm and in eirect find by irresistible implication [that]
he is not guilty of murder. What difference can it make... whether there
be two counts or one count, or whether there be two express findings or
one express and the other implied by law?"
13 For a summary of the subsequent history of this problem in Virginia
of. Benton v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 782, 21 S. E. 495 (1895). After the
case of Stuart v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, the General Assembly in
the Acts of 1877-1878 provided that, where a verdict was set aside on the
defendant's motion, he should stand at the new trial as if the verdict had not
been found. While this was in force, Briggs v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 554
(1886) came up, raising the question of whether a conviction of murder
in the second degree was an acquittal of murder in the first degree. The
court refused so to instruct the jury in view of the statute, and, on appeal,
the statute was sustained as constitutional. The Legislature, however, in
the revision of 1887 provided that if the verdict be set aside and a new
trial granted, the accused shall not be tried for any higher offense than
that of which he was convicted at the last trial.
14 See infra note 23.
15 Supra note 4. Peckham, J. says at 533, 26 Sup. Ct. at 124: "... As the
judgment stands before he appeals, it is a complete bar to any further
prosecution for the offense set forth in the indictment... No power can
wrest from him the right to so use that judgment, but if he chooses to
appeal from it and to ask for its reversal, he thereby waives ... his right
to avail himself of the acquittal of the greater offense in the judgment he
has himself procured to be reversed."
16 Jones v. State, 144 Miss. 52, 109 So. 265 (1926), writ of error denied,
273 U. S. 639, 47 Sup. Ct. 96 (1926).
17This view is sometimes taken, as in the Trono case, mtpra note 4, on
the ground of waiver by the defendant. Brantley v. State, 132 Ga. 573,
64 S. E. 676 (1909), afd, 217 U. S. 284, 30 Sup. Ct. 514 (1910); Watson
v. State, 224 Pac. 368 (Okla. 1924). Other courts like Jones v. State, cupra
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would allow a conviction on the second trial for a higher degree
of the offense than was had on the first trial.
So long as the ingenuity of lawyers retains its pristine vigor,
no claim can be made for the infallibility of any rule. Defend-
ants convicted of murder in the second degree have been known
to object to a failure on the pew trial to try them for first degree
murder1 8 It would seem, however, that the opportunities for
ingenious objections were somewhat greater under the Califor-
nia rule,19 than under that of Trono v. United States.2 For ex-
ample, when a conviction of manslaughter was reversed on
appeal as being against the evidence, the defendant claimed on
the new trial that a reversal precluded any further conviction
for manslaughter and that the former verdict barred a convic-
tion for murder.21 Similarly, a defendant convicted on the first
trial of murder in the second degree claimed on reversal that an
intervening statute abolishing the different degrees of murder
should operate to discharge him wholly; since the former verdict
acquitted him of first degree murder.22
Some argument for the adoption of the Trono rule can be
found if only in a desire to discourage such defenses as much as
possible. An even more cogent argument for its adoption is pre-
sented in a Nevada case.2 3 The language of the court is some-
note 16, adopt it because of a constitutional or statutory provision which
is construed as authorizing it. Veatch v. State, 60 Ind. 291 (1878) ; People
v. Palmer, 109 N. Y. 413, 17 N. E. 213 (1888); Gibson v. Somers, 31
Nev. 531, 103 Pac. 1073 (1909); Young v. People, 54 Colo. 293, 130 Pac.
1011 (1913); Newton v. Commonwealth, 179 Ky. 496, 247 S. W. 707 (1923).
18 Cf. Vaughan v. State, 18 Ala. App. 511, 93 So. 256 (1922); Ex parto
Williams, 213 Ala. 121, 104 So. 282 (1925).
19 Supra note 5.
2oSupra note 4.
21 People v. Huntington, 8 Cal. App. 612, 97 Pac 760 (1908); of. State
v. Ash, 68 Wash. 194, 122 Pac. 995 (1912). Note that in both cases the
convictions were affirmed. State v. Ash relies on the rule of Trono v.
United States, and although People v. Huntington indicates that oven
under the California rule such quibbling may be overruled, it is submitted
that there is less certainty that it will be than under the majority rule.
22 Beaupre v. State, 206 S. W. 517 (Tex. 1918) (conviction affirmed).
23 See Gibson v. Somers, supra note 17, at 533, 103 Pac. at 1074: "There
are many cases where a cold-blooded murderer, through the eloquence of
his attorney or sympathy for his relatives or those dependent upon him, or
where a majority of the jury, believing the defendant guilty of murder
in the first degree, in order to appease some member of the jury or for
other reasons, rather than to allow the accused to escape some punishment
or prevent a mistrial or total miscarriage of justice, agree to bring in a
verdict of a lower degree of homicide, when as a matter of right and jus-
tice, the defendant, if he got his just deserts, should be hanged by the
neck until he be dead. The People of the State, representing the victim
of the accused, on a new trial, if they can prove a clear and conclusive cae
of murder in the first degree ought to be entitled to exact the full penalty
of the law with equally as good a right as the defendant has to receive only
COMMENTS 983
what theatrical, but even though hardships may result in par-
ticular cases, it is sound in pointing out that the interests of
society are as much to be protected as those of the defendant,
that a verdict for a smaller offense may mean many things other
than innocence of higher offenses, and that it is better to allow
the state the opportunity to show this on a new trial, if it can.
the punishment provided by law for the lesser degree of crime and to hold
otherwise, we believe, would be a travesty of justice."
